The  Holey  Bonds of Matrimony: A Constitutional Challenge to Burdensome Divorce Laws by Horowitz, Elizabeth
THE "HOLEY" BONDS OF MATRIMONY:




Divorce laws in our country have changed greatly over the past
fifty years. Marriage and the family in general have transformed from
primarily social institutions into more private, individual-oriented
structures.' Some people call these evolutions a "crisis.",2 It is my con-
tention that changes in our social institutions must be reflected in the
laws that govern them, and while divorce laws have changed, they
have yet to change enough.
In Section I, I discuss the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause and the protection it provides to certain individual liberties
from unwarranted state intrusion.3 Included in those protected liber-
ties is the right to make personal and intimate decisions related to• 4
fundamental rights such as marriage.
In Section II, I argue, based on the relevant Fourteenth Amend-
ment doctrine, the trends in our society surrounding domestic rela-
tions, and the very personal nature of the decision to marry itself, that
along with the fundamental right to marry comes a fundamental
right to divorce which is protected under the Due Process Clause.
I discuss the fault-based divorce laws still in existence, as well as
many of their "no-fault" counterparts in Section III. I argue that
many of these laws infringe on the fundamental right to divorce.
In Section IV, I address two possible state interests in these laws:
preserving the stability of traditional marriages and protecting tradi-
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See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (affirming that there is a fundamental
right to marry).
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tional families in order to ensure the well-being of children. While
these interests might be legitimate, 5 I maintain that the divorce laws
supposedly promoting these interests impermissibly infringe on the
fundamental right to divorce because they are not closely tailored to
those interests and therefore fail to satisfy the heightened scrutiny
that is applied when a fundamental right is involved.
The essence of my argument is that the decision to end a mar-
riage is of such a private and intimate nature that any regulation in-
fringing on that choice which does not actually further a sufficiently
important interest of the state cannot be upheld under the concept
of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Constitution does not explicitly provide a right to privacy.6
Nowhere in its express language is such a right mentioned. However,
the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Constitution does
implicitly guarantee a right to privacy in certain circumstances' and
under various amendments. This implied right has frequently been
articulated as stemming from the notion of liberty that is guaranteed
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, also known as the
Due Process Clause. 9
The cases that recognize a right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment have been characterized as protecting two types of in-
terests.' The first is the individual's interest in his or her choice not
5 To a certain degree, the legitimacy of protecting traditional marriages and families is
questionable, as I discuss in greater detail in Section IV.
6 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (explaining that there is no explicit right to
privacy provided in the Constitution).
7 SeeUnion Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,251 (1891) (denying a court the power to
order a physical examination before trial in an action for personal injuries and declaring that,
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person").
8 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding the right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to include the right to have an abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)
(striking down an obscenity statute making private possession of obscene materials illegal be-
cause the statute infringed on rights of privacy grounded in the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 89 (1968) (implying protection of privacy grounded in the
Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (describing rights of pri-
vacy under various amendments); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (hold-
ing that a law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally infringes on the right to
marital privacy as implied in the penumbrae of rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
9 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (establishing the concept of liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass many rights of the individual, including mar-
riage and rearing children).
10 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (describing different interests involved
in the right to privacy).
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to disclose private matters.1' The second, which will be the focus of
this Comment, is the individual's interest in making certain impor-
tant decisions independently, free from unwarranted state intrusion.
2
The cases invoking this second interest explain that only those deci-
sions relating to freedoms and rights that are found to be "funda-
mental," or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"'' are to be in-
cluded in this constitutional guarantee. 14 If a right is found to be
fundamental, then it is protected "by the Fourteenth Amendment
against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disre-
spect. ' 5 Rights which the Court has found to be "fundamental," and
therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy,
include choices regarding procreation,' 6 contraception, 7 child rear-
ing, education,' and, of most importance to the current discussion,
decisions relating to marriage. 9
A fundamental right to marry has been alluded to in Supreme
Court case law as far back as 1888, when the Court described mar-
riage "as creating the most important relation in life. 20  In 1942, it
was again touched upon when the Court addressed the constitution-
ality of a law allowing the sterilization of habitual criminals and de-
clared that, "[mi]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
,,21existence and survival of the race.
It was about twenty years later when the Court discussed the right
to marry in terms of a constitutionally protected right to privacy. In
11 Id. at 599.
12 Id. at 599-600.
13 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
14 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (explaining that the right to privacy includes
only such "fundamental" rights).
15 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996).
16 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the right to
have an abortion as part of the right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment); Roe,
410 U.S. at 153 (establishing the right to abortion to be included in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (declaring the funda-
mental nature of marriage and procreation).
17 SeeEisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (discussing the right to privacy and its
inclusion of the rights of individuals to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-86 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy includes marital privacy and the right to
use contraceptives).
18 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (striking down a law requiring chil-
dren to attend public school because it infringed on parents' rights to educate their children as
they please).Is
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (striking down a law that prohibited mar-
riage of individuals not up-to-date in child support payments because it infringed on the fun-
damental right to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down a law banning
interracial marriage because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by in-
fringing on the fundamental right to marry).
20 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
21 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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the 1965 decision of Griswold v. Connecticut,22 the Court explicitly re-
ferred to "the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relation-
ship, 23 and described the relationship of husband and wife as "lying





In the monumental case of Loving v. Virginia, in which a state stat-
ute forbidding interracial marriage was struck down, the Court
rooted the right to marry in the Fourteenth Amendment.25  The
Court found that the challenged statute "deprive[d] the Lovings of
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment., 26 The Court stated further
that "[t] he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."27 This concept was most recently affirmed and reinforced
in the Supreme Court decision of Zablocki v. Redhail.2 1 In Zablocki, the
Court declared that "past [Supreme Court] decisions make clear that
the right to marry is of fundamental importance, 29 and "recent deci-
sions have established that the right.., is part of the fundamental
'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Proc-
ess Clause."30
The case law demonstrates that the choice to enter a marriage and
the decisions relating to marriage are of fundamental importance,
and are included in and protected by the implicit constitutional
guarantee of privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
II. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DIVORCE
Under the current doctrine, there are many arguments for find-
ing that the right to privacy rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment
22 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy includes marital privacy
and the right to use contraceptives).
23 Id. at 486.
24 Id. at 485.
25 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). The case was decided on a combination of equal protection and
substantive due process grounds. However, it explicitly refers to the concept of liberty embed-
ded in the Due Process Clause, and it has been interpreted as articulating a fundamental right
to marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003) (inter-
preting Loving to declare a fundamental right to marriage); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
383 (1978) (interpreting Loving to hold that the law in question deprived the couple of "a fun-
damental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry").
26 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
27 Id.
28 434 U.S. at 383 (affirming that there is a fundamental right to marry).
9 Id.
30 Id. at 384.
31 Id.
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Due Process Clause encompasses the right to obtain a divorce. It is
arguable that the well-established fundamental right to marry simply
includes the right to divorce. While the cases may refer explicitly to a
"right to marry," 32 none imply that once the right to marry is exer-
cised, the constitutional treatment of the marital relationship
changes. The language used in the right to marry doctrine is often
broad. For example, the right is described as encompassing the free-
dom to make "decisions 'relating to marriage. '03 Therefore, it is ar-
guably not just the right to enter a marriage that is constitutionally
protected but also the personal relationship itself, which would im-
plicitly include the right to end it.
In Griswold, the Court held that the right of marital privacy pro-
hibits the state from intruding on a husband and wife's right to use
contraception. Griswold had nothing to do with entering a marriage,
but the Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment (among others)
to protect the personal decisions made within the marriage. Such
"personal decisions" should logically include the decision to leave the
very relationship that triggers protection in the first place. This is es-
sentially an argument of pure logic. If the Fourteenth Amendment
protects an individual's choice to enter the personal and important
relationship of marriage, and it protects the privacy of the individual
to make decisions with respect to the relationship, then it logically
follows that the personal and individual choice to leave such a rela-
tionship must be protected as well. When applied to other funda-
mental rights, this logic is obvious. The right to use contraception"
does not mean that once you use contraception you must continue to
do so. The right to send your child to private school36 does not mean
that once you put him there he must remain there. So why would the
right to marry be any different?3 7 To find that the fundamental right
to marry does not include a right to divorce is the equivalent of find-
ing that your right to enter a marriage is protected, and your right to
make marital decisions is protected, unless, of course, that decision is
not to be married anymore, in which case the protection of the Four-
32 Id. at 383.
33 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
34 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
35 Id. (acknowledging a right to use contraception).
See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (describing the right of parents to
choose how to educate their children).
37 It might be argued that marriage is different because traditionally a marriage is supposed
to last forever, and therefore the ending of a marital relationship should be considered very
differently than the beginning of one. See Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-
Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 276-77 (1997) (listing common assumptions made in the legal
system regarding marriage and the traditional family unit). However, the current status of the
"traditional" family is questionable. I discuss this in greater detail in Section IV.
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teenth Amendment has expired and you are (figuratively but, alas,
not literally) on your own.
Of course, while this logical argument may be appealing, the ju-
risprudence surrounding both marriage and fundamental rights is
not that simple. There is a strong tradition of public policy favoring
the family unit s and generally marriage has been considered a social
relationship that is subject to the police power of the states.3 9 This
state power, however, is not unlimited.4 It is subject to, and has been
restrained by, the Fourteenth Amendment.41 Of course, on the other
hand, such due process protection is not unlimited either. The doc-
trine makes clear that in order to receive the full protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as has been afforded in cases surrounding
marriage, there must be a clear and distinct fundamental liberty in-
terest at stake.42 Therefore, the existence of a fundamental right to
marry will not likely be enough under the current doctrine to find
that the right to divorce, arguably a different right altogether, is logi-
cally established.43 This means that it will probably be necessary to
show that the right to divorce is fundamental in and of itself.
The Court has often found that for a right to receive the utmost
protection from unwarranted state intrusion under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, it must be "so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
4
It is questionable whether divorce by itself, when not simply catego-
rized as a personal marital decision, would be given such a ranking.
Prior to the 1960s, divorce was closely regulated and was only avail-
able when one spouse could be proven at fault,45 and grounds for
fault were limited to an exclusive statutory list.4 6  Before the mid-
nineteenth century, divorces were granted only through special legis-
38 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (discussing the tradition of pro-
tecting the marital family).
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) ("While the state court is no doubt correct in
asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State's police power, the State does not
contend in its argument before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited
notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so [in light of
this Court's precedents] .... " (citations omitted)).
4O Id.
41 See id. at 12 (striking down a marriage regulation on Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
42 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (describing the necessity of a fundamen-
tal right in order to apply heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment).
43 See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126-27 (taking a very narrow view regarding the establish-
ment of a fundamental right).
44 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
45 Only one spouse could be found at fault; the other had to be innocent. See infra note 101.
46 See Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-
Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REv. 607, 609 (1997) (discussing possible challenges to the pro-
posed return to fault-based divorce laws).
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lative actions. It was in the early twentieth century that the majority
of the states enacted legislation permitting courts to grant divorces. 48
It was not until the early 1960s that the fault system was abandoned
due to changes in attitudes regarding marriage, divorce, and the
state's role in each . 9 This was part of the transition of the concept of
family from a public institution to a much more private one.50
This brief historical overview demonstrates that while divorce was
always present in our ever-changing society, and while it has slowly
evolved into a more acceptable practice, 51 its history does not neces-
sarily support the establishment of a fundamental right. However,
the fact that the right to divorce might not be categorized as funda-
mental based on an argument of tradition in our society is not the
end of the inquiry. While rights have often been found to be funda-
51mental because of their historical and traditional significance, more
recent doctrine illustrates a divergence from that approach.
"' [H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.'5 3 The trend in
recent decisions has been to also consider the social changes our so-
ciety has undergone and to take such changes into consideration
when determining the amount of protection that is necessary under
the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that Due Process is properly
protected. 4
In Roe v. Wade, where a woman's right to have an abortion was
held to be fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court referred to "the influences of recent attitudinal change" and
the presence of "new thinking about an old issue. 55 This implies that
history alone will not always determine whether a right is fundamen-
tal when an activity has more recently come to be accepted as an im-
portant right in our society.
47 See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility in Marital Rela-
tions, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 605, 607-12 (1996) (describing the history of fault-based divorce).
48 Bradford, supra note 46, at 610 (noting that all states except South Carolina passed laws to
allow courts to dissolve marriages).
49 Id. at 611 (describing "distaste for public intrusion" as driving the movement away from
the fault system).
50 See Amy L. Stewart, Covenant Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REv. 509, 510
(1999) (describing the social evolution of marriage and family).
51 See Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Separation and Divorce: Causes and Conse-
quences, 90 AM.J. SOCIOLOGY 856, 861 (1985) (describing the increase in acceptance of divorce).
52 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (discussing how the history of a ight is
involved when establishing that right as fundamental).
53 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
54 See id. at 577-78 (discussing the emerging awareness of privacy rights); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 143-47 (1973) (discussing the changing attitudes toward abortion during the early
1970s).
55 Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
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In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held that a criminal statute prohib-
iting homosexual sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment! The Court addressed the many arguments
made regarding the historical prohibition of such conduct, and while
it found that much of the historical information was faulty at best,57 it
also went on to explain that "our laws and traditions in the past half
century are of most relevance., 58 Upon considering recent social and
legal development, the Court found "an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to con-
duct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." The right,
therefore, was not based on historical patterns but instead on a much
more recent "emerging awareness" in our nation of a fundamental
liberty interest.
This line of reasoning, when applied to divorce, would support a
finding that there should exist a fundamental right to dissolve one's
marriage. Studies surrounding the attitudinal change toward divorce
show that social acceptance of divorce has increased greatly over the
past half century.6° The legal changes are evident in the adoption of
no-fault divorce laws61 and the many states that have eliminated fault-
based divorce grounds altogether.62
The Court's Fourteenth Amendment analysis in the landmark
abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,63
lends further support to my argument. In Casey, the Court affirmed
the essential holding of Roe and explained the essence of the due
process doctrine in a new light when it discussed the rights that have
been granted protection including, inter alia, the right to make per-
sonal decisions regarding marriage and the right to decide "whether
to bear or beget a child." The Court explained:
56 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
57 Id. at 569-70 (discussing the problems of the historical arguments made with respect to
sodomy).
5 Id. at 571-72.
59 Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
60 See generally Thornton, supra note 51 (studying attitudinal changes with respect to divorce
and possible causes thereof).
61 Traditionally all divorce statutes were "fault-based," meaning that in order to obtain a di-
vorce, one spouse was required to sue the other and prove grounds of fault. If no fault was
found, a divorce would be denied. Around the early 1970s, states began to adopt no-fault alter-
natives through which a divorce could be obtained without having to prove the fault of one
party. See generally Matthew Butler, Grounds for Divorce: A Survey, I IJ. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
164 (1999) (summarizing changes to, and the current status of, divorce laws as of 2000);Jana B.
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443 (providing an analysis of the shift
from fault-based to no-fault divorce).
62 See Butler, supra note 61, at 165 (listing jurisdictions that have adopted no-fault divorce
laws).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
& Id. at 851.
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These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Be-
liefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State."
Again, this type of analysis would support a finding that a right to di-
vorce should be included in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
liberty. The decision to end a marriage is of a most personal nature
66
and is one that should be afforded due process 4?rotection as it bears
directly on "one's own concept of existence." The reference to
autonomy in the above quotation is also quite relevant. If autonomy
means anything, it must encompass an individual's right to decide
that they no longer wish to remain married. Marriage is a relation-
ship that the Court has described as "intimate to the degree of being
sacred. ' ' 8 Surely, the personal decision of an individual to end a mar-
riage when he has found that his marriage does not to live up to such
a standard must be protected.
Moreover, it is only logical that the decision to end a marriage is
every bit as personal and intimate as the decision to enter one. To
marry is to choose a person with whom to spend your life. It is the
personal and intimate nature of this decision that makes it funda-
mental under the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 To divorce is to choose
not to remain a life partner with that person. It is no less personal
and no less intimate. While it is true that divorce involves changing a
person's legal status in many respects, so does marriage, but the fun-
damental right to marry is not based on that status. It is based on the
actual relationship between the spouses, as the right to divorce
should be.
The question is not just whether society has traditionally accepted
divorce, but whether it should be left to the state to decide who can
and cannot end a marriage. The concept of liberty embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment, as addressed in cases like Roe and Lawrence,
gives us an answer-"our laws and tradition afford constitutional pro-
tection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, con-
65 Id.
66 See The Honorable Robert W. Lueck, The Collaborative Law (R)evolution: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come in Nevada, 12 NEV. LAWYER 18, 18 (2004), available at http://www.nvbar.org/
publications/Nevada%20Lawyer%2OMagazine/2004/April/CollLaw.htm ("A divorce is not a
legal problem. It is a relationship problem with collateral legal consequences.").
67 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
68 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1964).
69 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recog-
nized as one of the vital personal fights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.").
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traception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."70  A
personal lifestyle choice such as whether to remain in a marriage
should be up to the individual, not the government.
There is also direct doctrinal support for the finding that divorce
should be entitled to full protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. Divorce actions have been granted
greater protection compared to other types of actions because of the
special status of marriage in our society. In Boddie v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court found that denying access to a court of law in order
to obtain a divorce, solely because of the inability to pay court fees,
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7
1
Making similar arguments, the petitioners in United States v. Kras ar-
gued that the requirement of filing fees for bankruptcy actions were
similarly unconstitutional.72 The Court, however, denied the Kras pe-
titioners' claim and distinguished Boddie on two grounds. First, the
Court explained that in Boddie much attention was paid to the fact
that there is no way to dissolve a marriage except through the judici-
ary. The Court, however, also noted that the 'Judicial forum in Boddie
touched directly... on the marital relationship and on the associa-
tional interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of
that relationship. ''73  The Court continued to explain that, "[o]n
many occasions we have recognized the fundamental importance of
these interests under our Constitution." 74 The distinction drawn be-
tween access to the courts for bankruptcy proceedings and divorce
actions demonstrates the Court's willingness to treat divorce with
more protection than other rights. Furthermore, the express lan-
guage of Kras brings divorce into the arena of fundamental rights
surrounding marriage and marital decisions.75 This was again rein-
76forced in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., where the Court explained that "[clrucial
to our decision in Boddie was the fundamental interest at stake. 77
The Supreme Court has not yet directly ruled on whether there
does exist a fundamental right to divorce under our Constitution.
However, the doctrine surrounding marital relationships and the
special treatment of divorce in the Fourteenth Amendment Due
70 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
71 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) ("[D]ue process does prohibit a State
from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judi-
cial dissolution of their marriages.").
72 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 435 (1973).
73 Id. at 444.
74 Id.
75 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 n.10 (1978) (citing the differences between Bod-
die and Kras as supporting the fundamental importance of marriage).
76 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that a fee requirement violated the Due Process Clause
when proceedings resulted in termination of parental rights).
77 Id. at 113.
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Process Clause cases suggest that the Court should find that such a
fundamental right does exist.
III. HEAVY BURDENS AND WAITING PERIODS INFRINGE ON THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DIVORCE
It is my contention that many divorce laws now in effect that re-
quire heavy burdens and extended waiting periods infringe on the
fundamental right to divorce. My challenge is aimed at both fault-
based's and no-fault 9 divorce proceedings.
A. Divorce Laws
It is true that some form of no-fault divorce is offered in all juris-
dictions.' o However, in many states, fault-based divorce statutes still
exist and are put to use."' Furthermore, no-fault grounds, while ap-
pearing to be a feasible alternative, are not always as simple as one
might think. 2 I will be using Illinois law as a prototype of divorce leg-
islation, which includes both fault-based and no-fault grounds, that
should be found unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
8 3
In Illinois, there are twelve different grounds for divorce. The
fault-based grounds include impotence, a finding that one party is
still married to a previous spouse, adultery, desertion, habitual
drunkenness, addiction to drugs, attempted murder, extreme and
repeated physical or mental cruelty, conviction of a felony, and one
78 See generally Butler, supra note 61 (discussing various states' divorce laws).
79 Id.; see infra note 82 (discussing different types of no-fault statutes).
80 See Butler, supra note 61, at 164 (noting all jurisdictions have some form of no-fault di-
vorce law).
81 See id. Some examples of states that still provide fault grounds include Alabama, Con-
necticut, Mississippi, New York, and Utah. Id. at 170. For an overview of traditional fatlt
grounds and what they entail, see HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 656-59 (7th ed. 2005).
82 There are different types of no-fault statutes. Some states are considered pure no-fault,
meaning they have abolished all fault grounds and only offer no-fault divorces. Pure no-fault
states, including California and Colorado, make up a small minority. Thirty-three states offer
some form of a marriage breakdown ground, such as "irremediable breakdown," or "irreconcil-
able differences." The remaining states permit no-fault divorce based on the grounds of living
separate and apart, with periods of required separation ranging from six months to three years.
For an overview of the types of no-fault statutes and lists of states employing each, see CLARK &
ESTIN, supra note 81, at 646.
83 I chose Illinois because it is an example of a state offering no-fault as well as fault-based
grounds and because the no-fault section requires a waiting period. Because I challenge both
fault-based legislation and no-fault statutes that include waiting periods, and because Illinois law
is relatively typical compared to other jurisdictions with these types of laws, it was a good proto-
type of the kind of legislation I argue should be found unconstitutional.
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spouse infecting the other with a sexually transmitted disease s4 To be
entitled to a divorce on any of these grounds, fault must be proven in
a court of law.
To avoid having to prove fault in Illinois, the parties must have
lived separate and apart for a continuous period in excess of two
years and, in addition, they must show that irreconcilable differences
have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Then, the
court must determine that efforts at reconciliation have failed or that
future attempts to reconcile are not practicable or not in the family's
best interest. The two year separation period can be waived so long
as the parties agree to do so and have lived separate and apart for six
86months.
B. Infringement
The Illinois laws (and other similar states' laws87) infringe on the
right to obtain a divorce in various ways. Going through a divorce is a
very difficult personal and emotional experience, and difficult di-
vorce laws make obtaining a divorce an onerous and burdensome le-
gal process as well.88
It is important to note here that unconstitutional infringement
does not require an outright ban of the protected activity. In Carey v.
Population Services International,s9 where the Court struck down a regu-
lation prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors, the Court
pointed out that the "same test must be applied to state regulations
that burden an individual's right to decide to prevent concep-
tion ... by substantially limiting the access to the means of effectuating that
decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision en-
tirely." 0 Therefore, the law in question need not provide for an abso-
lute prohibition of a protected activity in order for it to be found to
infringe on a protected right.
In Casey, the Court applied an undue burden standard, holding
that "[o]nly where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability to [have an abortion] ... does the power of the State
reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process
m 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/401-al (West 1999).
85 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/401-a2 (West 1999).
86 Id.
87 See Butler supra note 61 (examining various state divorce laws).
88 See Lueck supra note 66, at 18 ("By nature, domestic relations cases are among the most
difficult, because they involve considerable emotional stress and uncertainty for litigants and
the attorneys."); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 321
(2004) ("[W]hile statistically normal, the divorce passage is far from easy for most people.").
99 431 U.S. 678 (1976).
90 Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 8:4
"HOLEY" BONDS OF MA TRIMONY
Clause."9' It is this type of standard that would be most relevant to
the analysis of divorce laws. The argument for applying this type of
standard is further supported by the finding in Zablocki that reason-
able regulations of marriage are permissible, while more significant
infringements are not.92 This statement implies that only a significant
interference, as opposed to an outright ban, is necessary for the
Court to find that a marriage-related law is unconstitutional. It is not
necessarily the case that the laws I am challenging always make ob-
taining a divorce impossible (although that is sometimes the case),
but it is true that they place significant burdens" on the exercise of
the right, and the state interests do not suffice to justify these bur-
dens-a proposition which I will discuss in Section IV in greater de-
tail.
I will begin my analysis on infringement by discussing fault-based
divorce laws. Applying the standards enunciated in Carey and Casey, it
should be found that such laws infringe significantly on the right to
obtain a divorce. In Illinois, an individual seeking a divorce on fault-
based grounds must prove that one of the statutory grounds exist
9 4
and they sometimes require substantial evidence.99 This process of
proving fault involves drawn out litigation, and at times hurtful accu-
sations, both of which are emotionally tolling for everyone involved.96
"The traditional adversary system... intuitively encourages conflict
and often inflames the feelings of anger, hostility, emotional pain,
and emotional trauma that normally accompany the divorce proc-
ess."97 The necessity of proving that a spouse has committed adultery
or has committed extreme and repeated physical or mental cruelty in
order to end a marital relationship is a significant intrusion into the
91 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
92 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) ("[R]easonable regulations that do not sig-
nificantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be im-
posed.").
93 An example of a law placing an undue burden on obtaining an abortion is the require-
ment of spousal notification. The court found that such a requirement would impose a "sub-
stantial obstacle." Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-94.
94 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing fault-based grounds for divorce in
Illinois); Morrow v. Morrow, 145 N.E.2d. 381, 383 (IIl. App. Ct. 1957) (holding that a divorce
can only be granted for causes listed in the statute and anything less is not sufficient as grounds
for divorce).
95 See Metoyer v. Metoyer, 235 N.E.2d 882 (IIl. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that to establish adul-
tery, proof of the clearest and most convincing nature must be provided to prove that the actual
carnal act was committed).
96 See Paul A. Nakonezny et al., The Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate Across the
50 States and Its Relation to Income, Education, and Religiosity, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 477, 477-78
(1995) (describing the system of proving fault as perpetuating "acrimony and conflict in the
social-psychological and communication climate of the divorce").
97 Lueck, supra note 66, at 18.
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marriage relationship itself,9 as well as an impermissible "substantial
obstacle" 9 to the exercise of the protected right to divorce.
At times the burden is incredibly demanding. In Illinois, it has
been held that to establish cruelty within the meaning of the divorce
law a spouse must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
alleged guilty party committed acts of physical violence against the
other spouse resulting in pain and bodily harm on at least two sepa-
rate occasions.00 Once is not enough. This is a heavy burden to bear,
and a lot to have to stand, especially considering the evidentiary is-
sues that can present themselves in such a situation.'0 ' Furthermore,
a divorce will only be granted on fault-based grounds to an innocent
person, free from fault herself, whose spouse is proven guilty of the
type of wrongdoing that constitutes fault under the applicable stat-
ute. °3
There is also a direct and significant parallel between the burdens
that these laws impose and those that the Court considered in Casey,
where a law requiring spousal notification in order to obtain an abor-
tion was struck down. In finding that the notification law imposed a
substantial obstacle, the Court paid much attention to the fact that
the law could prevent women who are victims of domestic violence
98 See Dana Milbank, Blame Game: No-Fault Divorce Law is Assailed in Michigan, and Debate
Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at Al. In her article, Dana Milbank quotes the Michigan
Bar's Family Law Section, an organization made up of a group of divorce lawyers who have spo-
ken out against recent proposals advocating a return to fault-based divorce regimes, because
they believe such laws result in invasions of privacy. Michael Robbins leads the group's resis-
tance and stated that if states do return to fault-based regimes, lawyers will "need a private inves-
tigator again" and will have to "start snooping in the bedrooms." Id. He continued, "We don't
want every aspect of life being examined and the courtroom being turned into a forum to air
dirty laundry." Id.
99 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
1o0 See Hating v. Haring, 260 N.E.2d 396, 398-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (finding that the defen-
dant physically abused the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence despite conflicting tes-
timony).
1 SeeJudith T. Younger, Marriage, Divorce, and the Family: A Cautionary Tale, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1367, 1367-69 (1993) (describing the difficult aspects involved in proving fault). These
problems are especially relevant when the case involves domestic violence. See Martha Heller,
Should Breaking Up Be Harder to Do?: The Ramifications a Return to Fault-Based Divorce Would Have
upon Domestic Violence, 4 VA.J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 263, 271 (1996) ("Because of heightened stan-
dards of proof, the increased stakes involved in fault-based divorce, and the hostility that so of-
ten accompanies fault-based proceedings, a fault-based system would erect a series of hurdles
that would make it more difficult for victims of domestic abuse to pursue the option of di-
vorce.").
102 A traditional defense to a fault-based divorce action is recrimination that occurs when the
plaintiff is shown to have committed an act that would constitute a marital offense. When both
parties are found at fault, the divorce is denied outright. See CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 81, at
660. Other defenses include connivance (occurs when the plaintiff consents to the commission
of the offense) and condonation (when marital cohabitation resumes, the court interprets the
continuation as forgiveness on the plaintiffs part). See id.
103 See supra note 61 (discussing fault-based divorce laws).
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from obtaining an abortion.1 0 4 This analysis is directly analogous to
situations that might occur involving divorce. Fault-based laws or
those with extended waiting periods could render it impossible for
women who are victims of domestic violence to obtain a divorce.
Because of the heavy burdens involved and the drawn out legal proc-
ess, a domestic violence victim might not be able to prove fault and
might be too afraid to even start the process, knowing that it will en-
tail a long and difficult legal battle. This could result in a person be-
ing essentially trapped in an abusive relationship. Furthermore, any
attempt to leave his or her spouse without first obtaining a divorce
might not be a feasible option because of the other legal issues in-
volved, such as property division and child custody.'06 The undue
burden standard as applied in Casey, therefore, applies in an almost
identical manner to a case involving divorce when domestic violence
is an issue.
When an individual wants to end an inherently personal relation-
ship like a marriage, it is a decision of the utmost personal "auton-,,107
omy, and the state's requirement of proof of one of its listed statu-
tory grounds, and the oppressive burdens that often accompany
them, 0s is a major intrusion on that autonomy. Because the decision
to divorce should be included among the "intimate and personal
choices... central to personal dignity and autonomy,"'°9 it is pro-
tected under the Fourteenth Amendment"0 from the unwarranted
state intrusion that these fault-based laws inflict.
104 Casey, 505 U.S. at 893.
105 See Lueck, supra note 66 (discussing the consequences of divorce law in Nevada).
106 If an abused spouse does not have the economic resources to support herself, she might
feel economically trapped, while a divorce would allow her to receive property and/or spousal
support. If there are children involved, leaving without a divorce and some kind of custody ar-
rangement can be dangerous, first, because it will likely only anger the abusive spouse, and sec-
ond, because it is possible that kidnapping laws would apply to the situation.
107 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
108 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Semmler, 413 N.E.2d 502 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that in
order to establish grounds of extreme and repeated mental cruelty, it is not enough that recon-
ciliation is no longer possible and the marriage appears to be dead); Horzely v. Horzely, 365
N.E.2d 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (denying divorce because the wife's testimony that the hus-
band's behavior caused her depression at various times throughout the marriage was insuffi-
cient to establish the ground of extreme and mental cruelty); Collins v. Collins, 361 N.E.2d 787
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that for alleged conduct to constitute extreme and repeated men-
tal cruelty, it must have been substantiated on at least two occasions); Klakk v. Klakk, 354 N.E.2d
64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (holding that conduct merely causing embarrassment is not enough to
find mental cruelty).
109 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
10 1 am going to assume for purposes of the remainder of the discussion that there is an es-
tablished fundamental right to divorce. In the event that a fundamental right was not found,
rational basis review would apply, but for purposes of my argument I will be analyzing the di-
vorce laws only under strict scrutiny.
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Now I will turn the analysis to the no-fault alternatives that Illinois
offers and why they too infringe on the protected right to a divorce.
The no-fault statute, as described above, requires a two year separa-
tion when the parties do not agree to the divorce. Deciding to end a
marriage is a difficult decision in and of itself without it being
dragged out over a two year period-not to mention the many issues
that can remain unsettled during this time, including economic sup-
port,11' child custody, and visitation.1 2 Although the required separa-
tion time is shortened to six months when the parties agree to a di-
vorce, this does not apply when one spouse objects, and it can also be
used by a spouse for the purpose of dragging out a divorce, possibly
to gain leverage in negotiations. This is relevant because there are
many instances in which one spouse might be at the mercy of the
other."3  Furthermore, the same concerns arise here as under fault-
based laws when domestic violence is involved.
14
Here it is important to point out that the fundamental right to di-
vorce is not solely grounded in the protection of marital decisions be-
tween spouses, but also in the concept of individual autonomy as de-
scribed in Roel"5 and Casey."6 "Liberty protects the person from
unwarranted government intrusions, '.. and "the Constitution places
limits on a state's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions
about family and parenthood.""" It is notjust the marital relationship
that the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty component protects, but
the individual's right to make personal decisions relating to that rela-
I See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/504-a (West 1999) (providing for maintenance upon dis-
solution of marriage); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/505-a (West 1999) (providing for child sup-
port upon dissolution of a marriage).
1 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/603-a (West 1999) (providing for temporary custody or-
ders that stay intact only until dissolution is granted at which time a more permanent order will
be instated).
113 Here is a hypothetical situation that illustrates the complications involved in the option of
no-fault divorce that Illinois law offers: If only one spouse is the income producer and she does
not want a divorce, the other spouse has the option of waiting two years to fulfill the require-
ment for no-fault, or going forward with a divorce on fault-based grounds. See 750 ILL. COMp.
STAT. ANN. 5/401-a(1) (West 1999) (stating grounds for the dissolution of marriage in Illinois);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/401-a(2) (B) (West 1999) (including a period of cohabitation un-
der written agreement as part of the time period for a separation). Because in cases like these
economic issues such as maintenance and child support depend on a divorce action, as well as
familial issues such as custody and visitation, a spouse can be forced into relying on a fault-based
action. Then, we must ask, what happens if the party cannot prove fault? This is an example of
the many difficulties that a person seeking a divorce might face. Even if it were possible to
prove fault grounds, it would entail further litigation with unreasonable burdens of proof, espe-
cially considering the fundamental interest at stake.
114 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
115 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
16 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
117 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (emphasis added).
118 Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (emphasis added).
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tionship. This is representative of the changes that have taken place
in our culture with respect to domestic relations,1 9 and the Four-
teenth Amendment must respect the individuals it was created to pro-
tect. Therefore, even when only one spouse desires a divorce, his or
her autonomy and personal privacy require the protection of the Due
Process Clause. So even if a six month separation requirement was a
reasonable regulation (which is questionable ), a two year waiting
period for a no-fault divorce where one spouse objects is a clear ex-
ample of the state placing an undue burden on the protected right to
decide to end a marriage. The only alternative to waiting two years is
to proceed on fault-based grounds, which, as I discussed above, also
infringe on the protected right to divorce. The bottom line is that it
should be the individual's choice to remain in a marriage, not the
state's.
It is also important to consider the other rights that are affected
by not being able to obtain a divorce. The inability to end a marriage
keeps a person from entering a new marriage. 12 ' Forcing people to
remain in marriages they consider to be over, therefore, prevents
them from formalizing new relationships. 122 Furthermore, adultery is
still a crime in some states, 12 so being forced to remain in a marriage
can effect individuals' rights in the bedroom as well.
124
I will not go into Illinois's law in great depth because my point is
more general. A divorce law requiring a heavy burden of proof2 5 or
an extended waiting period 26 infringes on the fundamental right to a
19 See Thornton, supra note 51, at 869 (concluding that rise in approval of marital dissolution
accompanied the rise of divorce in the 1960s and 1970s).
120 When a situation involves domestic violence issues, even six months might be too long to
wait.
1 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212-a(1) (West 1999) (listing prohibited marriages, includ-
ing "a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage of one of the par-
ties").
122 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (discussing the monopoly the state
has over the dissolution of marriage and how there is no other way but through the judicial
process for people to "liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that go with
marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage"). This could also in-
volve fundamental right to marry issues.
123 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2000) (defining adultery as occurring when
a person engages in sexual intercourse with another person when he has a living spouse or the
other person has a living spouse).
124 See Benjamin J. Cooper, Loose Not the Floodgates, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 311, 313-14
(2004) (discussing the effects of Lawrence on laws criminalizing adultery and fornication).
While these laws are seldom enforced, they have yet to be repealed, and theoretically, if a per-
son is forced to remain in a marriage they do not want to be in, the marriage and the laws re-
strict their sexual rights.
125 Here I refer to fault-based laws as requiring burdens that are too heavy.
126 Extended waiting periods include those similar to the two year mark found in the Illinois
statute. While a six month period might not infringe too heavily upon the right to divorce,
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divorce. To dissolve a marriage is an individual and personal choice.
The divorce process "is recognized to cause emotional trauma second
only to the death of a spouse, and ... requires unusual emotional re-
sources from clients at a time when they typically, are experiencing
high levels of stress and lowered coping ability."' For the courts to
require extended separations or proof of fault by one of the spouses
only makes the entire procedure more difficult and more emotionally
taxing. It can sometimes render it impossible. 118 The state's place-
ment of heavy burdens and extended waiting periods for obtaining a
divorce is an intrusion upon the personal decision to end a marriage
and therefore infringes on the individual's protected right. Because
it is an individual liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
that is at stake, the state's infringement is significant and the Consti-
tution must be applied to protect the individuals involved.
C. Standard of Scrutiny
When a fundamental right is established, it does not mean that
any legislation regulating that right is prohibited. "The Court's deci-
sions recognizing a right of privacy... acknowledge that some state
regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate.' 29 The
courts, however, apply a standard of heightened scrutiny in examin-
ing legislation that purportedly infringes on a protected right.2 30 Un-
der Roe, the Court explained that "[w]here certain 'fundamental
rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the le-
gitimate state interests at stake."1 ' In M.L.B., the Court described the
standard of scrutiny in terms of balancing when it stated that courts
must "inspect the character and intensity of the individual interest at





In the context of marriage, the Court in Zablocki stated that "the
decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as
decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family
waiting two entire years and then bearing the burden of proving irreconcilable differences is an
undue burden.
127 Pauline H. Tesler, supra note 88, at 321.
128 Some examples of when this would occur include a case in which both spouses are found
at fault or fault cannot be proven. See supra note 101 (discussing the complications in proving
fault in divorce cases). Another example is when fear of domestic violence is an issue. Id.
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
130 Id.
1 Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
1l2 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996).
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relationships.' ' 33 It explained further "that 'critical examination' of
the state interests advanced" 3 4 is necessary. However, when enunciat-
ing the standard of scrutiny to be applied, the Court does not use the
exact language found in Roe. The Zablocki Court explained that when
a law "significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently impor-
tant state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those in-
terests." 35 It is unclear what, if any, difference the Court intended by
using the word "important" instead of "compelling" and "closely" tai-
lored, as opposed to "narrowly." These differences, however, do
seem to appear in cases dealing with fundamental rights involving
family as well as marriage. In Moore v. Cleveland,136 which involved the
"freedom of personal choice in matters of... family life," the Court
explained the standard in terms similar to those found in Zablocki.1
3
1
There the Court held that when the government interferes with a
freedom protected under the Due Process Clause, courts "must ex-
amine carefully the importance of the governmental interests ad-
vanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation.' ' 38 While it is questionable whether the standard found in
marriage and family cases is as strict as that found in the abortion
cases, it is clear that the standard is heightened, and far greater than
the rational basis review required in cases where no fundamental
right is established. At the very least, when a law involving marriage
or family issues is involved, the state must show that its interests in
providing that law are important, and the law in question must be
closely tailored to furthering such interests.
Assuming a fundamental right to divorce was established, there-
fore, the state would retain the power to regulate divorce, provided it
had sufficient interests supporting the legislation, and that the regu-
lations were closely tailored to further those interests.
IV. POSSIBLE STATE INTERESTS AND WHY THEY FAIL
A. Protecting and Stabilizing the Traditional Institution of Marriage
One possible state interest furthered by placing heavy burdens
and waiting periods on divorce proceedings is the protection and sta-
138 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
134 Id. at 383.
135 Id. at 388.
136 Moore v. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (striking down, on due process grounds, a
residential ordinance that prohibited extended families from residing in the same home).
137 Id. at 499.
138 Id.
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bilization of the traditional institution of marriage . 9  Marriage has
historically been viewed as a public relationship, and it is often ar-
gued that there is a great "social interest in the family and marriage
as social institutions.,
4 0
While it is true that marriage plays a significant role in our soci-
ety,"' it is also true that in many respects the traditional notion of• • 142
marriage has all but disappeared. It was once legal for a husband to• 1 4 3
rape his wife, and historically a wife could not own property be-
cause title could only legally be held in the husband's name. These
traditional patriarchal practices have been abandoned and are exam-
ples of how the marriage relationship has evolved. Furthermore,
upon dissolution of a marriage "' [t]he trend is toward giving a simi-
larly favorable treatment to the wife as a homemaker and mother,
whether the courts refer to an implied contract, partnership, or spe-
cial equities, ' ' 45 whereas, the "traditional view of marriage often
tends to devalue homemaker services." 46 A recent example of an-
other social systematic change is the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage in Massachusetts. 47 These legal evolutions regarding marriage
and its consequences, in addition to the transformation of divorce
laws to include no-fault grounds, demonstrate the societal changes
that have taken place with respect to domestic relations. 48 The state's
interest, therefore, in protecting traditional marriages is lessened by
the fact that marriage itself has evolved, and logically then, so must
the individual's rights surrounding the marital relationship.
It is undisputable that marriage has changed a great deal over the
years. It is also true, however, that courts tend to favor the traditional
marital institution, and it is likely that its preservation would be con-
131 See Swisher, supra note 37, at 277-78 ("[T]he importance of marriage and the nuclear
family relationship as an invaluable social and institutional structure remains undiminished.").
140 Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REv. 177, 177
(1916).
141 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 12, 12 (1967) (describing the importance of marriage in
the United States).
142 See Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear
Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 Mo. L. REv. 527, 531 (2001) (discuss-
ing the development of family privacy regarding traditional notions of family).
143 SeeJaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L.
REv. 261, 261 (1993) (describing traditional rape laws with regard to the marital exception).
144 See Stewart, supra note 50, at 510 (explaining how, upon marriage, the husband assumed
all of his wife's legal rights).
145 Swisher supra note 37, at 278 (internal citations omitted).
146 Id.
147 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d. 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that a
ban against same-sex marriage violates the Massachusetts Constitution).
148 These changes are often referred to as the privatization of family law. See generally Singer,
supra note 61, at 1445-47 (explaining how the "no-fault divorce revolution" provides an exam-
ple of the privatization process).
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sidered a legitimate interest. 149 However, even in the case that the in-
terest in preserving traditional marriage is legitimate, burdensome
divorce laws still fail scrutiny under the Due Process Clause because
they are not closely tailored to protecting that interest.
When individual interests and society's interests bump heads, it
can have a truly dizzying effect and finding balance is exceedingly dif-
ficult.'5 In the case of divorce, however, creating hoops for parties to
litigate through is no solution. There is no evidence that the burden-
some legal processes of divorce currently in effect in many states ac-
tually encourage or lead to stable marriages.'-' When a fundamental
right is involved, it is not enough that the state have a legitimate in-
terest in its legislation, it must also be closely tailored to effectuate
that interest./5 In the case of difficult divorce laws, waiting periods
and heavy burdens have not been shown to have any effect on the
duration or quality of marriages in our country."' The fact is, when a
divorce is desired, a couple either gets one eventually, or they are pre-
vented from doing so because of extenuating circumstances, as de-
scribed in Section II.B above. So, while making it harder to obtain a
divorce does not influence couples to work it out, it certainly does
prolong and further complicate the dissolution process.154
Here it is important to repeat a point previously made: an out-
right ban on an activity is not necessary to find that the law governing
it is unconstitutional.' So, while it is true that the relevant divorce
laws will not in many cases make obtaining a divorce impossible, the
onerous legal process they entail can alone be found to infringe on
149 In her concurrence in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor referred to preserving the traditional
institution of marriage as a legitimate state interest. The issue, however, was not before the
Court, and in the current discussion I argue that even in the event that such an interest is le-
gitimate (which is questionable), the laws are not narrowly tailored to furthering the interest
and therefore fail the strict scrutiny standard. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that, here, Texas could not assert any legitimate state in-
terest, such as national security or preserving the institutional notion of marriage); see also infra
notes 142-48 (discussing the evolving notion of "family").
1o See Hafen, supra note 1, at 464-72 (discussing the struggles between the social and indi-
vidual interest in marriage).
151 See Milbank, supra note 98, at Al (addressing proposals for a return to fault-based laws and
noting that "critics doubt abandoning a no-fault system would keep families together. Divorce,
after all is a legal matter, while marriage breakdown is sociological and economic").
152 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (establishing heightened scrutiny).
153 See Heller, supra note 101, at 271 (observing that "a fault-based system would erect a series
of hurdles that would make it more difficult for victims of domestic abuse to pursue the option
of divorce"); Milbank, supra note 98, at Al (explaining the reasoning underpinning the doubt
that abandoning a no-fault system would keep families together).
154 See Heller, supra note 101, at 283 (describing how a return to fault-based divorce laws
would make "divorce proceedings ... more challenging due to heightened standards of proof,
increased stakes, and intensified hostilities").
155 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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the fundamental right to divorce, since it in no way furthers the
state's interest in preserving the institution of marriage.
While it is true that divorce rates have increased as divorce laws
have become less restrictive, there is evidence that the change in law
was due to attitudinal changes regarding divorce, not the other way
around. 15 6 It was people's attitudes towards marriage, divorce, and
their own autonomy and liberty that led to the widespread adoption
of no-fault divorce options,'5 and it is this autonomy and liberty that
the Fourteenth Amendment is meant to protect. Furthermore, there
is evidence that the sudden increase in divorce rates was a temporary
occurrence as the introduction of no-fault "merely speeded divorces
already in the pipeline, causing a short-term increase.,1 58
It is also important to remember that in some cases courts will
deny a couple a divorce, and we must keep in mind the ramifications
that an outright denial of a divorce can have on a marriage. Instead
of promoting a more stable relationship, a denial can easily result in a
sham marriage of no substance. 59 Marriages that remain when a di-
vorce is denied are not traditional marriages based on love and trust,
but instead are forced companionships and often a mockery to tradi-
tional marriage when the "spouses" end up living apart, leading sepa-
rate lives while still "married." A denial of divorce could also lead to
false allegations of fault, or even a fault-worthy action on the part of a
spouse, such as adultery, for the sole purpose of obtaining a di-
vorce.' These are just a few examples of how these laws do not pro-
mote, and can even undermine, the state interest in preserving tradi-
tional marriages.
156 See Stewart, supra note 50, at 535 ("Social changes impact divorce laws; divorce laws do not
effect social change.").
157 See Bradford, supra note 46, at 611-12 (describing how attitudes concerning the individual
and family began to change in the early 1960s); Thornton, supra note 51, at 869 (studying atti-
tudinal changes with respect to divorce and suggesting that changing viewpoints influenced
changes in the law).
158 Milbank, supra note 98, at Al. ("[University of] Wisconsin's Prof. Bumpass contends that
no-fault laws, when enacted, merely speeded up divorces already in the pipeline, causing a
short-term increase; divorce rates have been increasing steadily for a century, he says.").
159 See id. ("Opponents [to a return to fault-based laws] ... warn of... more instances in
which men remain legally married but abandon their families.").
160 One of the reasons fault-based divorce grounds were expanded, and states eventually
adopted no-fault divorce regimes, was the common occurrence of couples creating grounds for
themselves. Essentially, the spouses would agree on grounds and commit perjury to convince
the court that grounds did in fact exist. Judicial integrity became a serious issue in the realm of
family law. See Bradford, supra note 46, at 613-14 (explaining the history and problems of no-
fault reform); Swisher, supra note 37, at 270 ("[U]nder a fault-based divorce regime, a number
of couples in unhappy marriages often would have to fabricate various fault grounds for divorce
and resort to perjury, often with the assistance of their legal counsel.").
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B. Preserving Families and Ensuring Children's Well-Being
Another possible state interest against divorce is the preservation
of traditional families and safeguarding the children of those fami-
lies. One theorist argues that "[t]oday's lopsided competition be-
tween the individual and social interests has made the law a party to
the contemporary haze that clouds our vision of what a family is or
should be." ' This statement begs the question, who gets to decide
what a family should be? Should the definition of such personal rela-
tions be left to the state or the family members themselves?
Again we are faced with the reality that the concept of "family" 62 is
changing and "traditional families"163 are no longer necessarily the
norm. 6 4  Examples of the evolution of the family in our society in-
clude the many states that permit adoption by single individuals, as
well as homosexuals and same-sex couples.
65
The Court has also explicitly recognized the evolution of the
American family. In Moore v. Cleveland, where an ordinance allowing
only certain types of families to reside together was struck down, the
Court held that the Constitution prevented the state "from standard-
izing its children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain nar-
rowly defined family patterns."'66  Justice Brennan, in his concur-
rence, expanded on this idea, stating that, " [i] n today's America, the
'nuclear family' is the pattern so often found in much of white sub-
urbia," and "[t]he Constitution cannot be interpreted... to tolerate
the imposition by government upon the rest of us of white suburbia's
preference in patterns of family living.', 167 In Troxel v. Granville,6s a
case addressing issues of grandparent visitation, the Court stated that
"[t]he demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to
speak of an average American family," and, "[t]he composition of
161 Hafen, supra note 1, at 471.
162 See Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family, " 26 GONZ. L. REv.
91, 93-99 (1990-91) (describing the uncertainty of the definition of family and proposing that
a functional approach to a definition would be consistent with the social values that family and
marriage serve).
l6 See id. at 91-92 (defining "family" in the 1990s).
164 See Only One U.S. Family in Four is 'Traditional, 'N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1991, at A19 (discussing
how the structure of families have changed from the 1970s to the 1990s).
l6 See Stella Lellos, Litigation Strategies: The Rights of Homosexuals to Adopt Children, 16 TOURO
L. REV. 161, 166-74 (1999) (discussing the state laws that have been interpreted to allow adop-
tion by gay individuals). But see Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358
F.3d 804, 823 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding "that there are plausible rational reasons for the
disparate treatment of homosexuals and heterosexual singles under Florida adoption law").
166 Moore v. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
167 Id. at 508 (Brennan,J., concurring).
l6 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (striking down a broad visitation statute on due
process grounds because it interfered with the fundamental right to parent).
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families varies greatly from household to household."' 69 Declaring a
strong state interest in maintaining traditional family values also im-
plies that non-traditional family settings are somehow lesser, or infe-
rior to traditional ones. 7  Again, however, even if there was concrete
evidence that traditional-style families are advantageous to a thriving
society, and the Court found their preservation to be a sufficiently
important state interest, there is still a "closely tailored" problem.
The question that must be asked is when and how it was decided that
burdensome divorce laws help to preserve traditional families in the
first place. While divorce has been shown to adversely effect children
in certain situations, 7' this information is at best inconclusive 172 and
such effects are often attributable to problems faced by families prior
to the beginning of the divorce process.173 Furthermore, part of the
problem with divorce is the legal burdens it involves that cause the
process to be even more difficult than it inherently is. '74 If anything,
difficult divorce legislation only increases the harmful effects on fami-
lies, as opposed to mitigating them.
For legislation to be considered closely tailored to the proposed
state interest, it must actually further that interest. "[W] hen a
state.., burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt to
justify that burden as a rational means for the accomplishment of
some significant state policy requires more than a bare assertion,
based on a... complete absence of supporting evidence.' 75 Consid
ering the lack of evidence with respect to divorce litigation, it is not
likely that state interests in stringent divorce laws should pass muster
under strict scrutiny if applied in a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause analysis.
16 Id. at 63.
170 See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 468 (1990)
(arguing that "theories underlying the legal definitions of parent and nonparent deny the exis-
tence of nontraditional families"); Storrow, supra note 142, at 583-613 (discussing the tendency
of courts to favor traditional families when non-marital children are involved); Alison Harvison
Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER
& L. 505, 511 (1998) ("It is worth noting that critics of the traditional nuclear family attack it as
a norm that sets other sorts of families apart as inferior.").
171 See Tesler, supra note 88, at 322 (addressing the many studies documenting the harm that
can be caused to children involved in "high conflict divorces").
172 See Donna Ruane Morrison & AndrewJ. Cherlin, The Divorce Process and Young Children's
Well-Being: A Prospective Analysis, 57J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 800, 800-03 (1995) (discussing the in-
conclusive and contradictory nature of studies evaluating effects of divorce).
173 Id. at 808-10. (describing studies in which there was found to be no significance in the
altered parenting measures).
174 See Tesler, supra note 88, at 322 (discussing detrimental effects of "high conflict divorces"
in particular).
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1976).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to be presented with the question of
whether a fundamental right to divorce should be recognized under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The doctrine surrounding the Due
Process Clause implies that a decision as inherently personal as the
dissolution of one's marriage must receive the utmost protection
from unwarranted state interference. For a regulation to permissibly
infringe on an experience as inherently personal as dissolving one's
marriage, it must be tailored to effectuate a sufficiently important
state interest. Many divorce laws in effect today do no such thing.
Traditionally, marriage was viewed more as a social institution
than a private one, but that is no longer the case. Individuals are now
demanding more respect for their marital decisions. The Fourteenth
Amendment is meant to protect these individuals from the state's
overreaching when such private matters are concerned. The Four-
teenth Amendment must ensure that the state respects the personal
decisions of its citizens. It is not just about the respect they desire,
but the respect they deserve and the respect the Constitution is sup-
posed to guarantee.
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